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In Italy the 1990s were characterised by major
changes and even turmoil on the political stage. In
early 1992, investigations into political corruption
led to the overthrow of the political class. At the
same time, the signing of the December 1991
Treaty on European Union determined that mem-
ber states had to meet five convergence criteria
for membership in the single currency union. Italy
was far from meeting the Maastricht criteria, and
it was clear that it would have to struggle hard to
enter EMU.
The events of the early 1990s also had a strong
impact on industrial relations in Italy. The 1990s
saw quite a number of employment pacts, all of
which aimed at increasing the flexibility of the
Italian labour market. In this paper, we provide a
description and an assessment of the major agree-
ments in 1992, 1993, 1996, 1998 and 2002.
The Italian economy in the 1990s
Italy is one of the leading economies of the world.
At the same time it shows one of the highest
regional disparities worldwide. The central and
northern part of Italy is characterised by more
flexible modes of production, high labour mobility
and relatively low unemployment rates. By con-
trast, the south of Italy (Mezzogiorno) is marked
by insufficient wage differentiation, lack of infra-
structure, low quality of public services and the
presence of organised crime.
The following table shows some indicators of
regional differentials in 1995 and 2001.
These regional disparities make support for the
south one of the central issues in all negotiations
about employment pacts.
A further characteristic of the Italian labour mar-
ket is its high youth unemployment rate (27 per-
cent in 2001). Furthermore, long-duration unem-
ployment (12 months and over) as a percentage of
total unemployment was 63.4 percent in 2001 (see
OECD, 2003,Table 24).
Italy has a very high percentage of small and medium
sized firms which are considered the motor of the
Italian economy.1 Until the early 1990s Italy’s indus-
trial relations were characterised by a very low
degree of coordination. The employment pacts
described below (in particular the 1993 agreement)
led to a complete restructuring of industrial relations.
The social parties
Trade unions
In Italy, there are three main associations of trade
unions:
1) The CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del
Lavoro), the General Confederation of Italian
Labour, has close ties with the Democratic Party
of the Left (Democrazia di Sinistra). It was for-
merly dominated by the Italian Communist Party
(Partito Comunista Italiano).
2) The CISL (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati
Lavoratori), the Italian Confederation of
Labour Unions, has links with the Italian
Popular Party (Partito Popolare Italiano), for-
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Italy Centre-North Mezzogiorno
1995 2001 1995 2001 1995 2001
GDP at market prices (shares) 100.0 100.0 75.8 75.6 24.2 24.4
GDP per capita 100.0 100.0 119.2 118.0 66.4 67.8
Productivity (GDP per worker) 100.0 100.0 105.3 104.9 86.3 87.2
Employment rate 57.4 61.0 60.9 65.3 51.1 53.2
Unemployment rate 11.6 9.1 7.6 4.8 20.4 18.6
Note: Latest labour data refer to January 2003.
Source: OECD Economic Surveys: Italy (2003), Table 3.
1 In 1999,49.1 percent of all workers in the manufacturing sector in
Italy were working in firms with less than 50 employees,which is by
far the highest percentage in major economies, see OECD
Statistical Database on Enterprises(2002).merly with the Catholic Christian Democrat
Party (Democrazia Cristiana).
3) The UIL (Unione Italiana del Lavoro), the
Italian Confederation of Labour, is associated
with the socialists.
In 1994, CGIL had 5.2 million members (2.7 mil-
lion retired), CISL 3.7 million (1.5 million retired),
UIL 1.7 million (0.5 million retired).This compares
to a workforce of around 22.5 million.
There is very little information on membership out-
side the three main trade union confederations in
Italy.Several so-called “autonomous”unions and con-
federations exist, but little is known about their inter-
nal organization, functions, status and strength. Most
of them operate in the public sector.These organiza-
tions are rarely involved in collective bargaining.
Each of the Italian union confederations includes
large numbers of retired workers and also unem-
ployed workers, in particular those unemployed
workers who held regular jobs in the official econ-
omy. In the Italian layoff system (the so-called
Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) a worker’s employ-
ment contract with the former employer is
retained, and he will probably maintain his links to
the union in case he was a member.
On 1 March 1991 CGIL, CISL and UIL agreed on
the so-called rappresentanze sindacali unitarie, the
unified union representation,which was supposed to
enable unions to speak with one voice and to give
them more bargaining power by joining their forces.
Employers’ associations
On the employers’ side, the main actor is the
employers’ association Confindustria, which has
105 territorial associations and 110 branch associa-
tions, totalling 107,000 firms with 4.1 million
employees. The CONFAPI (Confederazione Itali-
ana della Piccola e Media Industria) represents
65,000 small and medium-sized private enterprises
employing about a million workers.
Major agreements in the 1990s and early 2000s
Political and institutional background in the 1990s
The negotiations of 1992 and 1993 have to be seen
in light of the overthrow of the political class
resulting from the investigations into political cor-
ruption in early 1992. The operation Mani Pulite
(Clean Hands) revealed a complex web of corrup-
tion linking political parties, local authorities and
business. It became clear that most political parties
had long been involved in an institutionalised sys-
tem of bribes which had “milked” state companies
for political purposes and extracted huge sums
from businessmen in return for public-sector con-
tracts. When parliament was dissolved in January
1994, over one third of its members were under
investigation. These events are also commonly
associated with the end of the First Republic.
From April 1992 to March 1994 the political parties
left the task of reform to governments mainly made
up of tecnici (non-party academics, managers or
senior civil servants). They managed to carry
through major reforms, including the toughest bud-
get since the Second World War and the abolition of
the old inflationary system of wage indexation, the
scala mobile, which had been introduced in 1946.
The 1992 agreement
The 10 years following the first Italian experience
of co-determination (concertazione sociale) (the
agreements of 23 January 1983 and 14 February
1984) were marked by a large number of partial
agreements that were characterised by their weak
stability and ineffectiveness,due to both the fragili-
ty of the trade union environment and the weak-
ness of the governments and, finally, due to the
temporary nature of the measures agreed upon.
Still, the central aim of these agreements was the
reduction of the sliding wage scale (scala mobile)
and of the cost of labour.
The agreement of 31 July 1992 between social par-
ties was the first step towards the major agreement
of 23 July 1993.For the first time,it brought forward
the idea of changing to a system of wage determina-
tion without automatic wage adjustments. It pro-
posed national contracts of 3-year duration based
on the projected inflation rates for the following
three years. At the end of each year of this three-
year period, wages should be readjusted if the dif-
ference between projected and actual inflation rates
is too high. However, this first step towards the
abandonment of the scala mobile was not stated
clearly enough and gave way to contesting. The
restructuring of the bargaining system (both in the
private and in the public sector) was postponed to a
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second period of negotiations,the start of which was
considered insecure and controversial.
The most controversial practical result was the
agreement to increase earnings by LIR 20.000 per
month (about EUR 10) in exchange for the “tem-
porary” suspension of the scala mobile for two
years and the renouncement of any firm level
agreements in the same period. While the CISL
celebrated the agreement to be the only way to
save the welfare state and as a first step towards
the reshaping of industrial relations in particular,
including true union participation,the other unions
and left-wing newspapers saw it as an agreement
forced upon them by the economic and political
circumstances. The Amato government threatened
to resign and even left-wing newspapers comment-
ed that this was not a purely theatrical gesture but
a real threat stressing how much the economic and
financial future lay in the hands of the workers and
of the unions (L’Unità, 2 August 1992).
The long-lasting re-negotiations about the cost of
labour and the reform of collective bargaining
between government and social parties started in
autumn 1992, and they almost ended prematurely
due to two government changes. The whole process
has to been seen against the background of the
biggest political and institutional crisis after the
Second World War (described above), which was
supposed to lead to the “Second Republic”.The end-
less negotiations were thus also due to the extreme
instability of Italian politics during that period and
in particular caused by the weakness of the third
involved party in the negotiations, the government.
The 1993 agreement
The final agreement of 1993, also known as the
Ciampi Protocol, was reached after three-party
negotiations (intese triangolari), bilateral agree-
ments between trade unions and employers’ asso-
ciations and bilateral arrangements between trade
unions and the government, some of which were
followed by laws, thus constituting a whole mosaic
of accords. It was signed by the government and
22 employer and employee organizations with the
exception of agricultural organizations. After
3 July 1993 the 3 major unions CGIL-CSIL-UIL
consulted for the first time all their members for
their support in this matter. 67.05 percent voted in
favour. Union leaders regarded this vote as a “real
democratic success for the union movement” and
“as a reference method also for the future”
(L’Unità, 24 July 1993).
The first element of the agreement is the removal of
the scala mobile system. The only remaining ele-
ment of wage indexation was the introduction of an
indexation system to compensate for delays in con-
tract renewals in the private as well as in the public
sector (equal to 30 percent of the projected inflation
rate for delays up to 3 months, 50 percent% for
longer delays).
The Protocollo sulla politica dei redditi e dell’occu-
pazione, sugli assetti contrattuali, sulle politiche del
lavoro e sul sotegno al sistema produttivo (Incomes
Policy Agreement),agreed upon on 3 July 1993 and
ultimately signed by the social parties on 23 July
1993, was received as a historical agreement with
constitutional character because it reshaped indus-
trial relations in Italy.Indeed,the principal content
of this agreement consists of new bargaining rules
at all levels, in particular trade union participation
at all levels with the aim of creating more stable
relationships between social partners.
The agreement is characterised by a new attitude
on both sides of industry (parti sociali): former
agreements always consisted of advantages and
sacrifices for all social partners while the 1993
agreement stresses “common objectives”.
The reform of the collective bargaining system is
considered the most important piece of the agree-
ment. The agreement provides for a two-tier bar-
gaining system (doppio livello contrattuale) with
specific indications for the relationship and func-
tioning between them: a national collective labour
contract (contratto collettivo nazionale di lavoro)
and a second bargaining level (secondo livello di
contrattazione) on a firm basis or on a regional
basis. The national sectoral contracts provide for
normative standards and minimum wages.The con-
tracts at the second bargaining level can determine
further wage increases and provide for more spe-
cific contract conditions. Put differently, the
national contracts are aimed at keeping up pur-
chasing power while the second level can distribute
gains reached through higher productivity.
While in the 1992 agreement some unions (with
the positive exception of the CISL) still consid-
ered their role to be passive and wage adjustments
to be a fair reaction to past price increases, theynow acknowledge that wage increases are also a
cause of price increases and that therefore the
unions’ role is a more comprehensive one which
has to take into account the whole economic
framework.
Firm-specific wage increases are made possible
within the framework of the second bargaining
level. Decentralised bargaining (secondo livello
contrattuale) only takes place if agreed upon in the
national contracts. Thus, the second bargaining
level is no must and also no “right” in itself. Still,
the passage referring to “the specific situation of
the sector” paves the way to a more decentralised
bargaining model, taking account of the individual
firm’s ability to pay.
The pact stipulates new rules for employment and
training contracts for young job seekers and paves
the way for the introduction of temporary work
agencies. These two measures were the first taken
towards facilitating integrating young workers into
the labour market.
The 1993 agreement also institutionalises the rapp-
resentanze sindacali unitarie. In all firms with more
than 15 employees a single body representing
employees is elected from a list of candidates pre-
sented by the trade union associations. These spe-
cial union representatives are authorized to nego-
tiate, at the firm level – together with the regional
union organizations – all issues in connection with
the national contracts.
To sustain this political change, the parties
involved have planned a large number of initia-
tives devoted to the promotion of research and
innovation, human capital formation and the cre-
ation of business and employment and supported
by large private and public investment programs.
All parties agreed that with public finances in bet-
ter shape all these tasks could be accomplished
more easily.
The Employment pact (1996)
On 24 September 1996, the Accordo interconfed-
erale was agreed upon by the government and the
social partners. It is better known as the Patto per
il lavoro, the Employment Pact. It added the miss-
ing piece to the 1993 agreement by providing mea-
sures of implementation for labour market policy,
in particular for fighting unemployment among
youth, women, in the south and long-term unem-
ployment. The government promised to provide
“fresh resources” for the years 1997–1999 amount-
ing to LIR 15,000 billion (approx. EUR 7.5 bil-
lion), to be financed by fighting tax evasion and
privatizing state-owned firms.
The ambitious aim was to halve the unemployment
rate by the end of the century. In particular,
1.7 million persons between the age of 15 and 29
were unemployed at that time and half of them
were unemployed for more than 2 years.
In order to promote employment, the parties
agreed on:
• Raising the maximum qualifying age for
apprenticeships from 20 to 24 years, with a pref-
erential clause for the south (26 years) 
• Gradually introducing a dual system of appren-
ticeship, redefined as a relationship combining
vocational training and working (following the
German model). The apprenticeship contracts
are subject to low entry wages and low social
security contributions 
• Investing 0.3% of the total labour income in
continuous formation 
• Partial tax deductibility of training costs
incurred by the worker 
• Introduction of manpower/part-time work
agencies (by authorization of the labour min-
istry) which employ (formerly unemployed)
workers and lease them to other firms 
• Providing incentives for part-time work (up to
24 hours of work per week) by adjusting social
contributions for new entrants and re-entrants
into the labour force 
• Favouring business start-ups by providing easier
credit access 
As for working hours, the government supported
an “orientation” towards a legal maximum of 40
hours per week instead of 48 hours.
So-called area contracts (contratti d’area) are target-
ed at economically depressed regions which are
identified by a government agency from time to
time. Under these agreements, local authorities and
social partners collaborate to co-ordinate job-creat-
ing efforts in specific sectors while introducing sim-
plified administrative procedures. The intention of
these agreements is also to allow for more wage dif-
ferentiation across geographical areas.
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Complementing those labour market measures are
agreements dealing with improving professional
training and fostering scientific research.All these
measures were to be accompanied by reviving pub-
lic investment projects –- focussing on the trans-
portation and the energy sector – which were
frozen in the wake of the corruption scandal.
While all union leaders praised the employment
pact as “good”,“very important”,“innovative”, the
leader of Confindustria, Giorgio Fossa, added
some scepticism: “It is an important step forward,
but is certainly not yet the solution to all prob-
lems”. He underlined the necessity of reducing the
cost of labour by 1.2 percent by relieving employ-
ers from the duty of paying workers’ health cover-
age by transferring it to the 1997 budget. (La
Repubblica, 25 September 1996).
Social pact for development and employment (1998)
On 22 December 1998, the Social Pact for Deve-
lopment and Employment (Patto sociale per lo
sviluppo e l’occupazione) was agreed upon by
33 parties including the government,Confindustria
and the three major parent unions, CIGL, CISL
and UIL.
The 1998 agreement provides for several measures
that alleviate the tax burden of both firms and
workers and for the extension of new types of con-
tracts.The major issues of the 1998 agreement were
the following:
• Labour costs will go down by 1.2 percent before
the year 2003 by transferring employers’ contri-
butions for maternity leave and family
allowances to the general budget. In addition
employers’ contributions for safe working are
reduced and the state financing program for
social security contributions in the south will be
extended.
• Income tax is reduced by 1 percentage point in the
second tax interval (from 27 to 26 percent); this
step is to be by financed by fighting tax evasion.
• The dual income tax (DIT) hitherto comprised
two different tax rates for firms: a lower one for
those gains that were reinvested and a higher
one for the gains used for dividends. The lower
tax rate shall be extended to all capital
accounts;this step will lead to a tax relief of LIR
6,000 billion (approx. EUR 3 billion) in the two
years following investments.
• Co-determination is now extended also to local
authorities whose representatives have signed
the agreement.
• To fight illegal work, adjustment contracts (con-
tratti di realleamenti) should be more widely
used; these contracts regularise black-market
activities by treating underground employment
as new visible employment, which will give rise
to preferential tax treatment.
• Professional training is supported by LIR 1,600
billion (approx.EUR 800 million) in three years
and allocation of resources is handed over to
the regions.
• Streamlining the administrative procedures for
public investment projects.
Furthermore, a minor change was made to the
two-tier bargaining system: the quota of the pro-
duction premium on which the firms do not have
to pay contributions was increased from 2 to
3 percent.
The pact for Italy (2002)
After its election in October 2001, the new center-
right government led by Silvio Berlusconi pressed
for reforms of the labour market, the tax system
and the pension system. It appointed a group of
experts which drafted a White Paper setting out
the main lines of its reform policies. After several
general strikes and the murder of the labour law
consultant and one of the authors of the White
Paper, Marco Biagi, by the Red Brigades in spring
2002, negotiations between the social partners
were concluded. On 5 July 2002, the Italian gov-
ernment, employers’ organizations and trade
unions - with the notable exception of the Cgil
union - signed the “Pact for Italy”’. An interesting
side-aspect of the agreement is that the govern-
ment explicitly recognises the importance of active
cooperation between social partners and the suc-
cess of the 1992 and 1993 agreements in allowing
Italy to join EMU.
The agreement covers three main issues: incomes
policy and social cohesion; “welfare to work”
(including labour market matters); and investment
and employment in the Mezzogiorno regions.
First, the agreement envisages a tax reform, in par-
ticular income tax reductions for families earning
up to EUR 25,000 per year as well as a reduction
and simplification of company taxation.Second, under the heading “welfare to work”,a
long list of instruments aimed at encouraging and
assisting workers in entering or re-entering the
labour market was agreed on. Most prominently,
those measures included the institution of public
employment services, promotion of education and
training for employability and income support
measures for unemployed people. The latter
involved an increase in unemployment benefits
together with an increased monitoring of search
activities of the unemployed. Income support
schemes for the poor were to be introduced.Those
measures were aimed at increasing both support,
and the famous articolo 18, the article of the
Workers’ Statute providing additional employ-
ment protection for workers employed in firms
with more 15 employees (which the government
wanted to abolish) was only marginally altered in
the end, following strong opposition by all trade
unions.
Third, investment and employment in the
Mezzogiorno was to be boosted by increasing pub-
lic expenditure and simplifying procedures to pro-
vide businesses with credit.
Not much can be said about the success of this lat-
est employment pact so far. The only action taken
so far is the passing of a “proxy law”, DDL 848bis
including labour market reforms, in early 2003.
Ten years of employment pacts in Italy
Sine 1992, Italy has seen quite a number of impor-
tant agreements between labour market parties
and the government. These employment pacts led
to a complete overhaul of the Italian system of
industrial relations. Did these changes have any
impact on Italy’s employment performance? To
answer this question, in the next section we will
present the results of a unique study on the flexi-
bility of the Italian labour market following the
1992 and 1993 employment pacts.
While it is clear that many of the measures agreed
on will only have an effect on employment in the
long run, it is instructive to see the immediate
effects of increased flexibility, in particular on new
entrants into the labour market.
Finally, we will then briefly summarise the state of
affairs nowadays and give an outlook on what
might be the long-run effects of the Italian labour
market reforms.
Some evidence for the increased flexibility of the
labour market
In 1997 the ISTAT, the National Statistical Office,
commissioned a study on the flexibility of the
labour market following the 1993 agreement.2 It
interviewed 8,000 firms in the production and ser-
vice sector with more than 10 employees. In partic-
ular, all firms with more than 500 employees were
interviewed. Firms were asked to give information
on the main forms of contractual flexibility at the
firm level.This study is an important confirmation
of a change. The number of atypical contracts has
increased considerably and the system of incen-
tives (output premiums) has undergone huge
changes.In the sequel;we will describe some of the
main results from the Istat study and provide cor-
roborative evidence from other sources.
• Firm-level negotiations
In 1995–96, 9.9 percent of firms with more than 10
employees, equivalent to 38.8 percent of the all
workers, were involved in firm-level negotiations
within the two-tier bargaining system agreed upon
in the 1993 agreement. There is a strong relation-
ship between firm size and propensity to negotiate
at the firm-level: the percentage of firms involved
in firm-level negotiations goes from 3.3 percent
of the firms with 10-19 employees, 15.7 percent
of those with 20-49 employees, up to 61.1 percent
in the class of firms with more than 500 employees.
This pattern applies to both industrial and service
sector and holds across all geographical areas.
However, firm-level negotiations are more com-
mon in the industry than in the service sector.
Also, they are more common in the north than
in the south: while 44.4 percent of all workers
in the North-West are involved in firm-level ne-
gotiations, it is only 34% in the centre and in
the south.
• Flexible compensation schemes
The 1993 agreement also suggested new schemes
of remuneration, in particular different sorts of
performance-related pay. Thereafter piece-rate
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pay, una tantum pay (i.e. bonuses from time to
time), bonuses for team performance, so-called
flexibility bonuses, bonuses for regular presence
and premiums based on the economic performance
of the whole firm were introduced in a large num-
ber of firms. In particular, premiums based on eco-
nomic performance were introduced in 58.6 percent
of the firms with new firm-level contracts, followed
by bonuses for team performance,which were insti-
tuted in 32.2 percent of those firms.
Additional empirical evidence by Casadio and
D’Aurizio (2000) for the manufacturing sector
shows that the adoption of flexible wage premi-
ums is complementary to working time flexibili-
ties. Both types of flexibility together may favour
efficiency.
Casadio (1999) and Rossi and Sestito (2001) sug-
gest three main effects of firm level wage agree-
ments on wage differentials: Because paid bonuses
are fairly homogeneous across workers within the
same firm, the first effect is to reduce wage disper-
sion inside the firm. The second effect is the
enlargement of the wage differentials among simi-
lar qualifications, but in different firms, with high
or low productivity and profitability. The last
effect, only partly induced by the previous two, is a
small increase of regional wage differentials
between firm located in the north or in the south
of Italy.
• Contract lengths
To evaluate the degree of flexibility in the labour
market, it is important to have information on the
distribution of different types of contracts. At the
beginning of 1996,92 percent of all those employed
had an unlimited contract. This reveals a high
degree of rigidity in the stock of workers in 1996.
However, among those that started working on a
new contract during the year 1996, only 45.3 per-
cent were offered a contract of undetermined
length. Thus, a remarkable 54.7 percent were
offered contracts with limited length.
Conclusion and outlook
The precious section showed that the Italian
labour market has started to become more flexible.
The increased number of limited-term contracts
(see also Frey and Pappada 2002) for new hires is
going to change the turnover patterns in the Italian
labour market in the long run, as the fraction of
workers on those contracts increases. The more
decentralised bargaining system will lead to
increased efficiency as worker compensation will
follow their productivity more closely.
The latest employment figures for Italy are encour-
aging (see Table 1): employment rates have
increased, unemployment has declined. The most
recent OECD Economic Survey on Italy (OECD
2003) states that Italy’s strong employment perfor-
mance is “a clear result of the greater flexibility” of
the labour market following the reforms of the
1990s. However, the employment and unemploy-
ment gap between the north and the south of Italy
has not been diminished.
The agreements reached were a necessary and
overdue step to pave the way for Italy’s economy
in the new century. In particular, they were crucial
in allowing Italy to enter EMU. While first results
of the reforms in the 1990s are quite encouraging,
Italy still has some way ahead in order meet one of
the main goals of the Lisbon European Council,
namely to raise the overall EU employment rate to
70 percent by 2010.
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